In many settings, heterogenous agents make non-contractible investments before bargaining over both who matches with whom and the terms of trade. In thin markets, the holdup problem-that is, underinvestment caused by agents receiving only a fraction of the returns from their investments-is ubiquitous. Using a non-cooperative investment and bargaining game, we show that holdup need not be a problem in markets with dynamic entry-even if they are thin at every point in time. This provides non-cooperative foundations for the standard price-taking assumption in matching markets, and shows that intertemporal competition can perfectly substitute for intratemporal competition.
Introduction
In many markets, crucial investments are sunk by the time agents bargain over prices and allocations. For example, workers and employers invest in human and physical capital well before bargaining over who will match with whom and for what wages. This can lead to holdup problems-that is, agents underinvesting because they do not expect to fully appropriate the returns from their investments (e.g., Williamson 1975; Grout 1984; Grossman and Hart 1986; Tirole 1986; Hart and Moore 1990) and severely limit the efficiency of these markets (e.g., Hosios 1990; Acemoglu 1996 Acemoglu , 1997 Cole, Mailath, and Postlewaite 2001a; de Meza and Lockwood 2010; Elliott 2015; Felli and Roberts 2016) .
What market forces might prevent such holdup problems? Informally, the standard answers involve the market being sufficiently thick-in the sense that each market participant has many close substitutes, and hence can plausibly take the prices that she faces as being independent from her investments.
1 For example, the literature investigating the efficiency of investments under competitive matching (e.g., Cole, Mailath, and Postlewaite 2001b; Peters and Siow 2002; Samuelson 2013 and 2017; Nöldeke and Samuelson 2015; Chiappori, Salanié, and Weiss 2017; Chiappori, Dias, and Meghir 2018; Dizdar 2018 ) assumes holdup problems away by focusing on markets featuring a continuum of price-taking agents on each side, and Acemoglu and Shimer (1999) show that holdup need not be a problem in directed search environments also with a continuum of agents on each side. 2 While, in practice, many markets are not often particularly thick-so the arguments above do not readily apply-many markets feature substantial inflows and outflows of agents. For example, at any given time, most employers cannot find more than a handful of appropriate available candidates and, similarly, most candidates cannot find more than a handful of appropriate job openings. Over time, however, most employers can interview a large number of appropriate candidates and, similarly, most candidates can interview for a large number of appropriate job openings. This motivates the questions that we investigate in this paper:
To what extent can future entry generate present competition? Can intertemporal competition substitute for intratemporal competition? In particular, can markets that appear thin at every point in time nevertheless be sufficiently competitive to prevent holdup?
The contribution of this paper is twofold. First, we show that intertemporal competition can perfectly substitute for intratemporal competition. In particular, we show that dynamic entry in a two-sided matching market can allow everyone to obtain the full returns from their marginal investments-and hence eliminate the holdup problem. Intuitively, even if there are only a few close substitutes for a given agent today, the expected entry of close substitutes in the future creates present competition for this agent. Second, we provide non-cooperative foundations for the widely used price-taking assumption in matching markets (e.g., Chiappori, Iyigun, and Weiss 2009; Nöldeke and Samuelson 2015; Eeckhout and 1 Gretsky, Ostroy, and Zame (1999) formalize this idea in the context of the transferable utility assignment game by showing that (i) in finite economies, agents generically do not get their marginal products, and (ii) in continuum economies, (small groups of) agents generically get their marginal products. They also formalize the idea that sufficiently large finite assignment economies are generally approximately perfectly competitive. 2 The competitive matching literature assumes that agents are price takers-precluding holdup-in order to investigate other possible sources of investment inefficiencies like coordination failures, participation constraints, and imperfect information.
Kircher 2018; Chade and Eeckhout 2019) . This clarifies the conditions under which the pricetaking assumption is appropriate, and suggests that dynamic entry can be an important force driving price-taking behavior. To the best of our knowledge, this paper is the first to deliver either of these two objectives.
We model two-sided matching markets as a non-cooperative investment and bargaining game featuring stochastic inflows and outflows of agents. There are finitely many types of agents-with potentially few agents of each type in the market at any point in time (that is, limited intratemporal competition within types). Prior to entering the market, agents on both sides have access to a rich investment technology. Agents' investments shape their matching surpluses. These investments can include general and type-specific investments.
Different types can have access to different investments. Investments are not contractible, and hence sunk by the time agents enter the market. Once in the market, agents bargain according to a standard protocol in the spirit of Rubinstein (1982) : In each period, one agent is randomly selected to be the proposer. The proposer chooses whom to make an offer to as well as how to split the resulting surplus. The agent receiving the offer then decides whether to accept it-in which case she matches with the proposer (and both leave the market)-or reject it-in which case no match occurs in this period.
We characterize the type-symmetric Markov-perfect equilibria of this game for all sufficiently high discount factors, and we show that there is no holdup problem in any such equilibrium-in the sense that no investment deviation by any agent affects anyone else's payoffs, and hence each agent obtains the full returns of any unilateral investment deviation that she makes. 3 The intuition is roughly as follows: On the one hand, if one chooses to invest more than the other agents of her type, she can play off the agents on the other side of the market to obtain the full marginal returns from this deviation. On the other hand, if one chooses to invest less than the other agents of her type, the future entry of agents of her type allows the agents on the other side to ignore her without any payoff consequences, so she again obtains the full (negative) marginal returns from this deviation. In other words, even while engaging in decentralized non-cooperative bargaining in a market that may appear thin at every point in time, everyone is a price taker-and hence a residual claimant of the surplus created or lost by any unilateral investment deviation. As a result, everyone's private and social incentives to invest are perfectly aligned.
A natural benchmark for our work is the literature on the assignment game with ex ante 3 In a type-symmetric Markov-perfect equilibrium, all agents of a given type follow the same strategywhich conditions only on the (current and expected future) matching opportunities in the market.
non-contractible investments. 4 There is a large literature-dating back at least to Becker (1975) -that investigates the holdup problem in this setting. An important message from this literature is that only under special circumstances can everyone fully appropriate the social value of their investments. To illustrate this point, assume that, once investments are sunk, a Walrasian outcome of the resulting matching market is selected. In such markets, there are typically many Walrasian equilibria, and these support a continuum of possible payoffs for each agent. Leonard (1983) (see also Demange 1982) shows that an agent fully appropriates the social value of her investments if and only if she receives her highest possible payoff among all the Walrasian equilibria. Hence, a natural way to guarantee investment efficiency is to give each agent her best possible Walrasian payoff. Unfortunately, however, this is usually impossible, since it requires the existence of a unique Walrasian equilibrium that pins down all prices-a situation that, as shown by Gretsky, Ostroy, and Zame (1999) ,
is not generic in finite markets.
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This paper contributes to the literature investigating the conditions under which matching markets are competitive-in the sense that its members are price takers (e.g., Gretsky, Ostroy, and Zame 1999; Cole, Mailath, and Postlewaite 2001a) . For example, in finite matching markets with unidimensional attributes and complementarities in these attributes, Cole, Mailath, and Postlewaite (2001a) provide a condition, called "doubly overlapping attributes", that guarantees that there is an essentially unique stable outcome, and that the associated prices continue to clear the market after any unilateral investment deviation. Under these conditions, agents are price takers-in the sense that no unilateral change in attributes affects the market prices-and, as a result, efficient non-contractible investments can be supported in equilibrium. We take a dynamic approach to address similar questions, and we find that essentially no restrictions on the nature of the investments and resulting matching surpluses are required to preclude holdup problems when agents are sufficiently patient.
In order to treat attribute choices as a non-cooperative game, Cole, Mailath, and Postlewaite (2001a) introduce a bargaining function that associates a particular stable outcome to each choice of attributes. They show that, for any efficient profile of investments, there is a bargaining function that-by appropriately selecting the stable outcome after any devia- 4 The assignment game is a static two-sided one-to-one matching market with transferable utility. See for example Shapley and Shubik (1972) . 5 It is possible to simultaneously give everyone on one side of the market her maximum possible Walrasian equilibrium payoff, but this requires also giving everyone on the other side of the market her minimum possible Walrasian equilibrium payoff (Shapley and Shubik 1972) . Nevertheless, if only one side of the market has investment opportunities, this selection can support efficient investments (e.g., Kranton and Minehart 2001; Hatfield, Kojima, and Kominers 2014; Felli and Roberts 2016) .
tion from these investments-supports these investments in equilibrium. However, as they discuss, this approach allows a lot of freedom for choosing the bargaining function, and alternative choices are generally not consistent with efficient equilibrium investments. An advantage of our non-cooperative approach is that it essentially uniquely pins down bargaining outcomes as a function of investments: For any type-symmetric investment profile, the notion of subgame-perfect equilibrium uniquely pins down everyone's payoffs. Makowski and Ostroy (1995) generalize the First Theorem of Welfare Economics by relaxing the price-taking and market-making assumptions: They consider a finite population model in which individuals choose occupations, and those occupations determine the goods that can be consumed. They show that a version of the First Theorem holds in their environment under two conditions. The first condition requires that everyone fully appropriates the social value of her actions, and the second condition eliminates coordination problems. In this paper, we show that the full appropriability condition is endogenously satisfied in our dynamic non-cooperative bargaining game in the limit as agents become arbitrarily patient.
Several non-contractual solutions to the holdup problem in bilateral settings have been proposed. For example, Gul (2001) shows how holdup need not be a problem for unobservable investments, and Che and Sákovics (2004) show that holdup need not be a problem when the investment and bargaining stages are intertwined. 6 In contrast, we focus on settings in which agents must sink their observable investments before bargaining in a matching market, and we show how intertemporal competition can eliminate the holdup problem.
Roadmap
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we illustrate the main ideas in the context of a simple example. In section 3, we describe the general model and, in section 4, we present and prove our main result. We relegate some details of the analysis in section 2 to Appendix A, and relatively standard results that we use to prove our main result to Appendix B and Appendix C. 
Example
In this section, we present a simple example that captures the essential ideas of this paper.
We start, in subsection 2.1, by reviewing the standard holdup problem in the context of an investment and bargaining game featuring two buyers and two sellers. 7 Then, in subsection 2.2, we describe a homologous market with sequential entry, and we illustrate how, in this case, the holdup problem vanishes as agents become arbitrarily patient. For simplicity, in the version of this example featuring sequential entry, we assume that each agent that leaves the market is immediately replaced by an identical agent (or replica).
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Later on, we show the analogous no holdup result in a more general setting that allows (i) stochastic entry (a relaxation of the replica assumption), (ii) many types of buyers and sellers, and (iii) a rich investment technology including general and type-specific investments.
Holdup in a market without sequential entry
Let us describe a simple game featuring a standard investment holdup problem. There are two identical buyers, b 1 and b 2 , and two identical sellers, s 1 and s 2 , with a common discount factor δ. In the first period t = 0, they simultaneously make investments. They can choose to either invest or to not invest. Their investments shape their matching surpluses: When a buyer and a seller match in any period t = 1, 2, . . . , they generate 2 units of surplus if both have invested, 1 unit of surplus if only one of them has invested, and 0 units of surplus if none of them has invested.
(1)
Not investing costs zero, and investing costs c, with 1/2 < c < 1. Hence, efficiency requires that everyone invests if the discount factor δ is sufficiently close to 1.
We focus on the case in which investments at time 0 are not contractible. This requires specifying how the outcome (that is, who matches with whom and how the resulting surplus is shared) is determined as a function of the realized investments. We take a non-cooperative approach: Once the agents have sunk their investments, they bargain according to the fol- 7 The idea that holdup arises in finite static markets goes through in larger markets as well as in unbalanced markets (i.e., markets with different amounts of buyers and sellers). See for example Gretsky, Ostroy, and Zame (1999) and Cole, Mailath, and Postlewaite (2001a) for general treatments of this idea. 8 This simplifying assumption has been widely used in the dynamic matching and bargaining literature; see for example Rubinstein and Wolinsky (1985) , Manea (2011 ), Nguyen (2015 and Polanski and Vega-Redondo (2018) .
lowing standard protocol (e.g., Elliott and Nava 2019): In each period t = 1, 2, . . . , one of the four agents is selected uniformly at random to be the proposer. If the selected agent has already matched in a previous period, no trade occurs in this period. Otherwise, the proposer chooses one agent on the other side of the market, and makes her a take-it-or-leave-it offer to share their gains from trade. The receiver of this offer then either accepts it-in which case the pair match with the agreed shares-or rejects it-in which case no trade occurs in this period.
This game features a standard holdup problem: Each agent pays the full costs of her investment at time t = 0, but the thinness of the market implies that she need not fully appropriate the resulting increase in surplus in the matching stage-limiting her incentives to invest efficiently. Indeed, focusing on (Markov) strategies that only condition on the surpluses that the agents that are yet to match can generate, we now argue that there does not exist any
Markov-perfect equilibrium featuring efficient investments. For brevity, we focus on the case in which agents are arbitrarily patient.
Towards a contradiction, suppose that an efficient equilibrium exists. Given that the aggregate surplus is at most 4, at least one of the agents has a limit gross payoff that is bounded above by 1. Suppose, without loss of generality, that the limit gross equilibrium payoff of b 1 is bounded above by 1, and consider a deviation by b 1 to not invest. We show that b 1 's limit gross payoff under this deviation is bounded below by 1/2-i.e., this deviation reduces her limit gross payoff by at most half of the corresponding reduction in gross aggregate surplus.
Since this deviation involves no investment costs, b 1 's limit net payoff under this deviation is also bounded below by 1/2, which is strictly higher than 1 − c (the upper bound on her limit equilibrium net payoff). Hence, this deviation is profitable.
The key observation driving the argument is that, when everyone but b 1 invests, b 2 does not delay in equilibrium. 9 Hence, b 1 can just wait until b 2 matches, and then share the remaining unit of surplus approximately equally with the remaining seller-as specified by the unique subgame perfect equilibrium at that point. As a result, her payoff is bounded below by 1/2 in the limit as δ goes to 1. Intuitively, the deviator can hold out until her competitor leaves, at which point she faces a bilateral monopoly situation-where the surplus loss generated by her deviation is shared with another agent (while she pockets all the associated savings).
9 While the fact that b 2 does not delay in equilibrium seems intuitive enough (it is difficult to imagine how her bargaining position can improve after b 1 leaves), proving this formally requires some care. We relegate the details of the argument to subsection A.1 in Appendix A.
No holdup in a market with sequential entry
Now consider a homologous market featuring sequential entry. In the first period t = 0, a continuum of identical buyers and a continuum of identical sellers simultaneously make (non-contractible) investments. As before, they can choose to either invest or to not invest, and their investments determine the surplus of each match-as specified by (1). Each agent that invests has to pay the investment cost c in the period in which she enters the market.
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As in the market without sequential entry, when agents are sufficiently patient, it is efficient that everyone invests.
Once the agents have sunk their investments, they bargain according to the following standard protocol (e.g., Talamàs 2019b): In each period t = 1, 2, . . . , there are two active buyers and two active sellers. In particular, in the first period t = 1, two buyers and two sellers are selected uniformly at random to be active and, every time a buyer and a seller trade, they leave the market, and a new buyer-seller pair is drawn uniformly at random (from those that are yet to become active) to replace them. Hence, in each period, both the bargaining protocol and the set of surpluses that the active agents can create are exactly as in a subgame that starts in period t = 1 of the benchmark setting without sequential entry described above.
We argue that, in stark contrast to the setting without sequential entry, holdup in this game need not be a problem. Indeed, focusing on Markov strategies that condition only on the profile of investments made at t = 0 and the investments of the active agents, we
show that-when agents are sufficiently patient-there exists an efficient Markov-perfect equilibrium (in which everyone invests). 11 Intuitively, unlike in the case without entry, an agent that chooses to deviate from an efficient equilibrium (by not investing) cannot hold out until she faces a bilateral monopoly situation that allows her to share the surplus reduction generated by her deviation. In fact, we show that the price that such a deviator has to pay in order to match with an agent on the other side of the market is not affected by her deviation.
As a result, she faces the full negative consequences of her deviation.
In Appendix C, we show that there exists a Markov-perfect equilibrium of the subgame that starts at t = 1 for any profile of investments made in period t = 0. Hence, in order to
show that there exists an efficient Markov-perfect equilibrium, it is enough to:
1. Describe Markov-perfect equilibrium strategy profiles in the subgames that start with (i) everyone that is yet to trade (active or inactive) having invested, and (ii) all but one of the active agents having invested.
2. Show that, under any strategy profile that specifies these actions in these subgames and that everyone invests in t = 0, any unilateral investment deviation from this strategy profile is unprofitable.
First, let us describe Markov-perfect equilibrium strategies for the subgames where everyone that is yet to trade (active or inactive) has invested: Each agent accepts every offer that gives her at least w, and each proposer offers w to an agent on the other side of the market, who accepts. Each agent must be indifferent between accepting and rejecting an offer that gives her w; that is,
proposer's payoff
Second, let us describe Markov-perfect equilibrium strategies for every subgame in which all but one agent, who is active, has invested. As soon as the deviator leaves, switch to the strategy just described. While the deviator is active: Each non-deviator (i) offers w (defined by Equation 2) to some other non-deviator, who accepts with probability one, and (ii) accepts an offer if and only if it gives her at least w. The deviator (i) offers w to some non-deviator, who accepts with probability one, and (ii) accepts an offer if and only if it gives her at least w . The deviator obtains 1 − w when she is the proposer, so her cutoff w must satisfy
deviator's payoff when proposer
or, rearranging,
Hence, this is indeed an equilibrium, since 2 − w > 1 − w implies that the best the nondeviators can do is to obtain 2 − w when they are the proposers. We conclude that the deviator saves c but loses 1 in the limit as δ goes to 1. Hence, for all sufficiently high discount factors, her deviation is not profitable.
Model
There is a finite set I of types of agents, and a continuum of agents of each type. The type of an agent determines her investment opportunities and her resulting gains from trade, as specified below. All the agents have a common discount factor 0 ≤ δ < 1, common knowledge of the game and perfect information about all the events preceding any of their decision nodes in the game.
Investment
In the first period t = 0, all the agents simultaneously choose their investments: Each agent of type i chooses an investment from a finite set and j , and further that i is a much better fit for type j than j is, while i is a much better fit for type j than j is. To capture this situation, we can simply take the surplus y(x i , x j ) associated with
to be high relative to the associated investment costs, and the surplus y(x i , x j ) associated with any investment profile (
to be low relative to the associated investment costs.
Remark 3.2. We assume that all investments are decided before any bargaining occurs for two reasons. First, this highlights that our mechanism does not rely on intertwining the investment and bargaining stages (as is the case in Che and Sákovics 2004, for example). Second, this substantially simplifies the analysis by allowing us to leverage existing results in the non-cooperative bargaining literature (e.g., Elliott and Nava 2019 and Talamàs 2019b).
Non-cooperative bargaining
Once everyone chooses her investment in period t = 0, bargaining occurs in discrete periods t = 1, 2, . . . . For each type i, there are n i ≥ 2 bargaining slots. In any given period, each slot of a given type can be occupied by one agent of that type, or be empty. We refer to the agents occupying the slots in any given period as the active agents in that period, and we denote the total number of slots by n := i∈I n i .
In each period t = 1, 2, . . . , one slot is selected uniformly at random (i.e., each slot is selected with probability 1/n). If the slot is empty, no trade occurs in this period. Otherwise, its occupant becomes the proposer. The proposer a chooses an active agent b (which can be herself) and makes her a take-it-or-leave-it offer specifying a split of the surplus y( 
Stochastic entry
For each type i and each s ≤ n i , at the beginning of each period that starts with s empty bargaining slots of type i, a number s ≤ s is drawn according to a stationary probability distribution q i s . Then, s agents are drawn uniformly at random from those agents of type i that are yet to become active, and these are randomly assigned to different empty slots of type i. Assumption 3.4 substantially simplifies the analysis. Assuming that there is always at least one active agent of each type simplifies the analysis by guaranteeing that, when all the agents of the same type choose the same investments, payoffs are uniquely determined by our notion of Markov-perfect equilibrium (Proposition B.2). Assuming that there are always at least two active agents of each type further simplifies the analysis by guaranteeing that a deviating agent can play off the agents of 12 Binmore and Herrero (1988) consider these limits in a related dynamic bargaining model. other types, and that no unilateral investment deviation shrinks the relevant bargaining opportunities of the non-deviators.
Remark 3.5. Assumption 3.4 holds under fairly mild conditions on the stochastic inflow process. It holds, for example, if there is at least one active agent of each type in period t = 1, and q i n i −1 (0) = 0 for each type i. It also holds under the classical replica framework of the literature on non-cooperative bargaining in stationary markets (e.g., Rubinstein and Wolinsky 1985 and 1990; Gale 1987; de Fraja and Sákovics 2001 , Manea 2011 , Lauermann 2013 , Nguyen 2015 , Polanski and Vega-Redondo 2018 , Talamàs 2019b ) as long as there are two or more agents of each type. 
Histories, strategies and equilibrium
There are three kinds of histories. We denote by h t a history of the game up to-but not including-time t. We denote by (h t ; i) the history that consists of h t followed by agent i being selected to be the proposer at time t. We denote by (h t ; i → j; s) the history that consists of (h t ; i) followed by agent i offering a share s to agent j. A strategy σ i for agent i specifies her investment and, for all possible histories h t , the offer σ i (h t ; i) that she makes following the history (h t ; i) and her response σ i (h t ; j → i; s).
The strategy profile σ is a type-symmetric Markov-perfect equilibrium if it induces a Nash equilibrium in every subgame, all the agents of any given type follow the same strategy, and each agent a's bargaining strategy conditions only on (i) the investment profile, (ii) the set {y(x b , x c ) | agents b, c active} of surpluses among the active agents, (iii) the set {y(x a , x b ) | agent b active} of surpluses that she can create with the active agents, (iv) for each type i that is such that not all agents of type i yet to enter have chosen the same investment, the number of vacant slots of type i, and (v) the going proposal (in the case of a response).
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No holdup in equilibrium
Theorem 4.1 below shows that an investment profile (x i ) i∈I can be implemented as a typesymmetric Markov-perfect equilibrium for all sufficiently high discount factors if and only if it is constrained efficient-in the sense that no agent, taking others' payoffs as given and free 13 This framework assumes that each agent that leaves the market is immediately replaced by an identical agent.
14 The number of vacant slots of type i is payoff relevant only when not all agents of type i yet to enter have chosen the same investment.
to choose whom to match with, has a profitable investment deviation. In particular, in the limit as agents become arbitrarily patient, in every type-symmetric Markov-perfect equilibrium, each agent's private benefit from any investment deviation coincides with its social benefit.
As background for this result, we note that, for each type-symmetric investment profile x := (x i ) i∈I and each type i, there exists V i (x) > 0 such that, in every subgame-perfect equilibrium of the subgame that starts at t = 1 with the investment profile x, V i (x) is the expected equilibrium (gross) payoff at the beginning of each period of each agent of type i (Proposition B.2). We denote the limit of V i (x) as δ goes to 1 by V i (x).
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Theorem 4.1. A type-symmetric Markov-perfect equilibrium with investment profile x := (x i ) i∈I exists for all sufficiently high discount factors if and only if
Proof. Necessity: Fix a type-symmetric Markov-perfect equilibrium σ with investment profile (x i ) i∈I . Let v i and w i denote the (gross) expected equilibrium payoff of each active agent of type i in a period in which she is and she is not the proposer, respectively. Given that σ is Markov perfect, each agent gets-when she is the proposer-the maximum amount that she can obtain while leaving the receiver indifferent between accepting and rejecting (unless she chooses to match with herself). Hence,
Given that each agent is selected to be the proposer with probability 1/n and that, in equilibrium, no agent is ever offered more than her expected equilibrium payoff, we have that
Hence, it is enough to show that, for any investment deviation from the equilibrium σ by an agent d, and for any agent a = d (of type i, say), a's expected equilibrium payoffŵ a when rejecting an offer from d gets arbitrarily close to w i as δ goes to 1. Indeed, given that the set of investments is finite, and that w i converges to V i (x) for each type i, when δ is sufficiently close to 1 each agent a must then choose her investment z a to maximize
Suppose that an agent d of type k deviates from σ by investing x d = x k . Given Assumption 3.4, neither the set {y(x a , x b ) | agents a, b active} of surpluses among the active agents nor the set {y(x d , x b ) | agent b active} of surpluses that the deviator d can generate with the active agents change while the deviator d is active. Hence, given that σ is Markov perfect, for each agent a we can letŵ a be her expected equilibrium payoff when rejecting an offer while d is active. Furthermore, when d is the proposer, she offersŵ a to some agent a, who accepts with probability one.
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Fix an arbitrary type i, and let a = d be an agent of type i such that there exists an agent c = a with whom the deviator trades with positive probability in equilibrium (Assumption 3.4
ensures that we can find such an agent). We argue thatŵ a − w i converges to 0 as δ goes to 1.
Since σ is type symmetric, this implies that, for each agent b of type i,ŵ b − w i also converges to 0 in the limit as δ goes to 1.
Let > 0. First, note thatŵ a ≥ w i − for all sufficiently high discount factors. This is because agent a can always wait for the deviator to leave, and-once this happens-her expected equilibrium payoff (when rejecting an offer) is w i . We now argue thatŵ a ≤ w i + for all sufficiently high discount factors. For contradiction, suppose otherwise. Given that, as we have just argued, for each type j and each agent b of type j other than the deviator, w b ≥ w j − for all sufficiently high discount factors, agent a must be making offers to the deviator for all sufficiently high discount factors. For each such discount factor δ, letting π > 0 be the probability that the deviator trades with someone other than a when a is not the proposer, we have that
and, given that d can always make offers to a,
If the weak inequality holds with equality, it is easy to check thatŵ a gets arbitrarily close to w i as δ goes to 1, a contradiction. Otherwise,ŵ a is strictly smaller than w i for all large enough δ, also a contradiction.
Sufficiency: Proposition C.1 shows that there exists a type-symmetric Markov perfect equilibrium in the subgame starting at t = 1 for every choice of agents' investments. Hence, for each investment profile z, we can pick an equilibrium σ(z) of the subgame that starts at t = 1. Given any investment profile (x i ) i∈I , define a strategy profile as follows: All the agents of type i invest x i , and each agent's bargaining strategy given any investment profile z is as specified by σ(z). This strategy profile is a Markov-perfect equilibrium if no agent has incentives to deviate at the investment stage (t = 0), which-as argued in the necessity part of the proof-is guaranteed (for all sufficiently high discount factors) by condition (3).
Remark 4.2. The absence of holdup in equilibrium does not imply that every equilibrium involves efficient investments, nor that every efficient investment profile can be implemented in equilibrium.
For example, coordination failures can sustain inefficient investment profiles in equilibrium for all sufficiently high discount factors. To see this, consider the example described in subsection 2.2, except that the surplus of any match is 0 unless both sides invest (in which case this surplus is 2). It is still efficient that everyone invests (for sufficiently high discount factors), but there is an (inefficient) equilibrium in which no one invests. Participation constraints can also prevent the existence of an equilibrium that implements an efficient type-symmetric investment profile. See for example Cole, Mailath, and Postlewaite (2001a, 2001b) and Nöldeke and Samuelson (2015) for an investigation of these sources of inefficiency in a competitive matching environment (that precludes holdup problems).
Appendices
A Details omitted from section 2
A.1 Details omitted from subsection 2.1
We show formally the key observation from the example in subsection 2.1: When everyone but b 1 invests, b 2 does not delay in equilibrium. Towards a contradiction, suppose that, when b 2 is the proposer, she delays (makes an unacceptable proposal) with probability π > 0, she makes an acceptable offer to s 1 with probability (1 − π)β, and she makes an acceptable offer to s 2 with probability (1 − π)(1 − β).
First note that, since b 2 delays, no one else can delay. To see this, let w i denote i's expected equilibrium gross payoff in any given period conditional on not trading in this period. It follows from min{w b 2 +w s 1 , w b 2 +w s 2 } ≥ 2 (which holds because b 2 delays) and w b 1 +w s 2 +w b 2 + w s 1 < 3 (which holds because the aggregate discounted surplus is below 3) that w b 1 +w s 1 < 1 and w b 1 + w s 2 < 1. Hence, in equilibrium, b 1 makes an acceptable offer with probability one to either s 1 or s 2 when she is the proposer. Moreover, by the same argument, the sellers both make acceptable offers to b 1 with probability one when they are the proposers.
Second, letting w be the quantity that a seller that is yet to match is indifferent between accepting and rejecting in a subgame in which b 1 has already matched, the fact that b 2 delays implies that w s 1 > w. We have that w = δ 1 4 (2 − w) + 3 4 w (4) and that
(1 − w b 1 )
where κ denotes the probability that b 1 makes an offer to s 1 in any period before anyone has matched when b 1 is the proposer, and w is the quantity that a seller that is yet to match is indifferent between accepting and rejecting in a subgame in which b 2 has already matched.
Given that 2 − w ≥ 1 ≥ 1 − w b 1 , that w < w, and that w s 1 = w s 2 unless β = 1 (because 
A.2 Details omitted from subsection 2.2
We show that-for all sufficiently high discount factors-every type-symmetric Markovperfect equilibrium of the game described in subsection 2.2 is efficient. Suppose for contradiction that there exists a sequence D of discount factors converging to 1, such that, for each δ ∈ D, there exists a type-symmetric Markov-perfect equilibrium σ in which only the sellers invest. We show that, for all sufficiently high δ ∈ D, a buyer can profitably deviate by investing. A similar argument shows that-when agents are arbitrarily patient-there exists no type-symmetric Markov-perfect equilibrium in which only the buyers invest, or in which neither the buyers nor the sellers invest.
Let δ ∈ D and consider the associated equilibrium σ. On the equilibrium path, each agent's expected payoff when she rejects an offer satisfies
Suppose that buyer b 1 deviates and invests, and consider a subgame in which b 1 is active.
From the point of view of b 1 , the environment is stationary. Hence, when she is the proposer, she makes offers that leave the receiver indifferent between accepting and rejecting, and which are accepted with probability one.
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Let s be a seller such that there exists a seller s = s with whom the deviator trades with positive probability, and letŵ s be her expected equilibrium payoff when rejecting an offer from b 1 . We show that, in the limit as δ goes to 1,ŵ s converges to 1/2. Given that σ is Markov perfect and specifies that each agent of the same type follows the same strategy, this implies that every other seller's expected equilibrium payoff when rejecting an offer from b 1 also converges to 1/2, so when δ is sufficiently high this deviation is profitable (the deviator's net gain is 1 − c > 0).
First, we argue thatŵ s is bounded below by 1/2 in the limit as δ goes to 1. Given that the seller s can always wait for the deviator to leave (at which point she obtains 1/2), for each > 0,ŵ s is bounded below by 1/2 − for all high enough δ ∈ D. A similar argument shows that the expected equilibrium payoffŵ b of each buyer b = b 1 conditional on not being the proposer in a period in which b 1 is active is bounded below by 1/2 in the limit as δ goes to 1.
Second, we argue thatŵ s is bounded above by 1/2 in the limit as δ goes to 1. Suppose for contradiction that there exists > 0 such thatŵ s ≥ 1/2 + for all sufficiently high δ ∈ D.
Given that, as we have just argued, for each buyer b = b 1 ,ŵ b is bounded below by 1/2 in the limit as δ goes to 1, seller s must be making offers to the deviator b 1 for all sufficiently high δ ∈ D. For each such discount factor δ, letting π > 0 be the probability that the deviator trades with someone other than s when s is not the proposer, we have that
, which implies thatŵ s converges to 1/2 as δ goes to 1, a contradiction.
B Uniqueness of perfect equilibrium payoffs
Proposition B.2 shows that, as long as there is always at least one agent of each type active in the market, the notion of subgame-perfect equilibrium pins down the payoffs of all agents conditional on their (type-symmetric) investment strategies. Moreover, these payoffs are independent of the details of the process by which bargaining slots are filled. This is a slight generalization of the analogous result in Talamàs (2019b) , where it is assumed that exactly one agent of each type is active in the market at each point in time. Proposition B.2 holds under the following assumption, which is weaker than Assumption 3.4.
Assumption B.1. There is always at least one active agent of each type.
Proposition B.2. Fix an investment profile x := (x i ) i∈I , and suppose that Assumption B.1 holds.
For every type i, there exists a value V i (x) > 0 such that, in every subgame-perfect equilibrium with investment profile x, the expected equilibrium payoff of each active agent of type i at the beginning of each period is V i (x).
The proof of Proposition B.2 is identical to the corresponding result in Talamàs (2019b), which is itself similar to the proof of the analogous result in Manea (2017) in the context of a model with random matching (as opposed to the framework with strategic choice of partners that we focus on in this paper). For completeness, we provide this proof here. Proposition B.2 follows from Proposition B.3, since every subgame-perfect equilibrium of a game with perfect information (as the one we study) survives the process of iterated conditional dominance (Theorem 4.3 in Fudenberg and Tirole 1991) .
Following Fudenberg and Tirole (1991, page 128) , we define iterated conditional dominance on the class of multi-stage games with observed actions as follows.
Definition B.1. Action a t i available to some agent i at information set H t is conditionally dominated if every strategy of agent i that assigns positive probability to action a t i in the information set H t is strictly dominated. Iterated conditional dominance is the process that, at each round, deletes every conditionally-dominated action given the strategies that have survived all the previous rounds. Fudenberg and Tirole (1991) show how iterated conditional dominance solves the alternatingoffers bilateral model of Rubinstein (1982) . Manea (2017) shows how iterated conditional dominance also solves a wide class of models similar to the one considered in this article.
We prove Proposition B.3 using the techniques developed in Manea (2017) . Proposition B.3. Fix an investment profile (x i ) i∈I . For every type i, there exists w i > 0 such that, in every game in which Assumption B.1 holds, after the process of iterated conditional dominance, every agent of type i always accepts (rejects) an offer that gives her strictly more (less) than w i .
Proof. The proof consists of two steps. First, we define recursively two sequences (m k i ) i∈I and (M k i ) i∈I , and show by induction on k that after every step s of iterated conditional dominance (see below for a formal definition of such a step), each agent of type i always rejects every offer that gives her strictly less than δm s i and always accepts every offer that gives her strictly more than δM s i . Second, we show that both sequences (m k i ) i∈I and (M k i ) i∈I converge to the same point (w i ) i∈I .
We denote the surplus y(x i , x j ) that a buyer of type i and a seller of type j generate when they match by s ij .
(i) Iterated Conditional Dominance Procedure
Let us start by reviewing how the process of iterated conditional dominance works in the present context. For simplicity, we break up the procedure into steps 0, 1, . . . , with each step containing three rounds.
Step 0.
Round 0a. Note that a strategy that ever accepts with positive probability a negative share is strictly dominated by the strategy reject all offers and make only offers that give me a positive share. These are all the actions that are eliminated in Round 0a. Hence, after this round every agent of type i always rejects every offer that gives her strictly less than δm because, by assumption, no agent of type j can ever offer any agent of type i a payoff higher than s ij , and, by the actions eliminated in round 0a, no agent ever accepts a negative payoff.
Hence, every strategy κ of an agent of type i that ever rejects with positive probability an offer a that gives her strictly more than δM 0 i is strictly dominated by a similar strategy κ that specifies accept a with probability π in every instance in which κ specifies reject a with probability π. These are all the actions that are eliminated in Round 0b; so after this round every agent of type i always accepts every offer that gives her strictly more than δM 0 i .
Round 0c.
Given the actions that survive rounds 0a and 0b, every strategy κ of every agent of type i that ever makes an offer with positive probability that gives y > δM 0 j to an agent of type j is strictly dominated by a similar strategy κ that specifies offer y − > δM 0 j to agent j with probability π in every instance in which κ specifies offer y to an agent of type j with probability π, since every agent of type j must accept both y and y − . These are all the actions that are eliminated in round 0c; after this round no agent ever makes an offer giving y > δM 0 j to any agent of type j.
Proceeding inductively, imagine that, after step s = k ∈ Z ≥0 , we have concluded (as we have just done for the case s = 0) that every agent of type i:
1. rejects every offer that gives her strictly less than δm We now show that points (1) to (4) also hold at step s = k + 1.
Step k + 1.
We refer to strategies that assign positive probability only to actions that have survived all previous rounds of iterated conditional dominance as "surviving strategies." Round (k+1)a. Given the surviving strategies, it is conditionally dominated for any agent of type i to ever accept an offer that gives her a surplus strictly lower than δm is defined as follows:
To see this, consider a period-t subgame where an agent of type i has to respond to an offer
. We argue that, for sufficiently small > 0, accepting this offer is conditionally dominated by the following plan of action-which is designed to give her a time-t expected payoff that approaches δm k+1 i as goes to 0: Reject all offers received at dates t ≥ t. When selected to be the proposer at time t , offer δM
, and make an unacceptable offer otherwise (e.g. offer a negative amount to some agent).
Note that since t ≥ t + 1, we have that k + t + 1 − t ≤ k. Hence, by the induction hypothesis, all agents j accept the offer δM
Equation 9 can be written as that, under the surviving strategies, the strategy constructed above generates an expected period-t payoff for i of δm k+1 i as → 0. Hence, letting > 0 be sufficiently small, this strategy conditionally dominates accepting x in period t. These are the actions eliminated in round (k+1)a; after this round no agent of type i ever accepts any offer that gives her a surplus lower than δm is defined by
To prove this, we show that for each agent of type i, all surviving strategies deliver expected payoffs of at most M . These are all the actions that are eliminated in round (k+1)b; after this round, no agent ever offers strictly more than δM k+1 j to any agent of type j.
Round (k+1)c. Given the surviving strategies, every strategy κ of agent of type i that ever makes an offer that gives y > δM k+1 j to agent of type j is strictly dominated by a similar strategy κ that specifies offer y − > δM k+1 j to agent of type j with probability π in every instance in which κ specifies offer y to agent of type j with probability π, since every agent of type j must accept both y and y − . These are all the actions that are eliminated in round (k+1)c; after this round no agent ever makes an offer giving y > δM k+1 j to any agent of type j.
(ii) The sequences (m k i ) i∈N and (M k i ) i∈N converge to the same limit. First, we prove by induction on k that for all i ∈ N , the sequence (m 
Second, we show that the sequences (m k i ) i∈N and (M k i ) i∈N converge to the same limit. Let
for all k ≥ 0; that is, that D k converges to 0 as k grows large. Indeed, Lemma B.4 (Manea 2017) . For all w 1 , w 2 , w 3 , w 4 ∈ R, |max(w 1 , w 2 ) − max(w 3 , w 4 )| ≤ max(|w 1 − w 3 |, |w 2 − w 4 |).
C Existence of a type-symmetric Markov-perfect equilibrium
Proposition C.1 below is analogous to the Markov-perfect equilibrium existence proof in Elliott and Nava (2019) .
Proposition C.1. For every investment profile x, there exists a strategy profile that is a typesymmetric Markov-perfect equilibrium of the subgame starting in period t = 1 with investment profile x.
Proof. Let the kind of an agent be determined by her type and her investment profile. Without loss of generality, we can assume that the investment sets {K i } i∈I do not overlap, so we can identify the set of agent kinds by K := ∪ i∈I K i , which is finite because each K i is itself finite. Let m denote the number of elements of K. We abuse terminology by referring to i ∈ K as "agent i." Let K be the finite set of all possible profiles of agents that can be active in the market at any given time. We characterize the Markov perfect equilibrium of the subgame that starts at t = 1 with any given investment profile, and then use it to show that such an equilibrium exists.
Consider a Markov-perfect-equilibrium strategy profile and its corresponding value function V : K → R m , where V (K) gives each agent's expected equilibrium payoff in any period at the beginning of a period that starts with active agent set K (before any agents become active this period). Consider a subgame with active agent set K ∈ K, and let s ij denote the surplus that agents i and j generate when they match in this subgame. By Markov perfection, agent j accepts any offer that gives her strictly more than δV j (K), and rejects any offer that gives her strictly less than δV j (K). This implies that no one offers more than δV j (K)
to any agent j. Therefore, a proposer i makes offers with positive probability only to j that maximizes her net payoff s ij − δV j (K). Hence, when i ∈ K is the proposer, the expected payoff of k ∈ K\{i} is j∈K\{i,k}
where π ij denotes the probability that i and j agree to trade. When i is the proposer, if there exists j ∈ K such that δ(V i (K) + V j (K)) < s ij , then she makes offers only to j ∈ K for which s ij − δV j (K) is maximum, and agreement obtains with probability one. Otherwise, she delays-in the sense that she makes offers that are not accepted in equilibrium. We denote the probability that i ∈ K delays by π ii . Thus, any agreement probability profile π i (K) ∈ ∆(K)-corresponding to the histories in which i is the proposer-that is consistent with the value function V must be in The value function V corresponds to a Markov-perfect equilibrium payoff profile if and only if V ∈ F (V ). So it is enough to show that the correspondence F has a fixed point. This follows from Kakutani's fixed point theorem (Kakutani 1941) . Indeed, the domain V of F is a non-empty, compact and convex subset of an Euclidean space. Moreover, since, for any K ∈ K and any i ∈ K, the correspondence Π i,K is upper-hemicontinuous with non-empty convex images, so is the correspondence f i,K , and hence so is F .
